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Abstract 
Public service deregulation is favoured for motivating providers to offer consumers better price- 
quality services. Consequently, consumers are enabled to make informed choices and choose for 
the best service provider. However, recent publications reveal that consumers are not capable of 
exercising optimal choice behaviour. Despite these concerns, evidence is lacking on the extent to 
which potentially vulnerable consumers make use of the core element of deregulation—switching 
health plans. This article is meant to study whether potentially vulnerable consumers do indeed 
switch less health plans in the deregulated Dutch health insurance market than regular consum- 
ers. In order to answer this question, we extract questionnaire data from the LISS panel, covering 
the years 2009-2012. A total of 16,779 health insurance consumers were included in the sample. 
The average response rate was 78%. Logistic regression results show that consumers being chro- 
nically ill, 60 and older, and without Internet access, do indeed switch less often. Intriguingly, non- 
working consumers and those living equal to or below the poverty line, turn out to switch more 
often than regular consumers. As a result, we conclude that the vulnerable consumer in the Dutch 
health insurance market is described by the following characteristics: chronically ill, 60 and older, 
and without Internet access. This specific group tends to get locked-in and suffers disproportion- 
ately from suboptimal choice behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
As a result of large-scale deregulation and the pursuance of the choice-agenda in the European public service 
sectors [1] (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes, 2010) there has been an international surge of interest for the outcomes of 
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these reforms for ordinary citizens [2]-[6] (Clifton et al., 2011, 2012; Grosso and Van Ryzin, 2012; Florio, 2013; 
Jilke, 2015). Similarly in the Netherlands, where the health insurance sector was deregulated with the establish- 
ment of the Health Insurance Act (2003-2006). It resulted in formal freedom of choice for the consumer. This 
means that the insured holds the right to switch to a different health plan at the end of each calendar year. 
In essence, deregulation aims to provide consumers a better price-quality offering by fostering competition 
between health plan providers. In turn, consumers are considered to make informed choices and to choose the 
best service provider [7] (European Commission, 2004). Although in practice, it turns out to be less straight 
forward than European policymakers imagined. Several recent publications show that the deregulation gains are 
primarily harvested by the “strongest” in society because the “potentially vulnerable”—including for example, 
low-skilled and the elderly—are not capable of exercising optimal choice behaviour [2] [6] (Clifton et al., 2011; 
Jilke, 2015). In the monopoly era, potentially vulnerable consumers could count on the standardisation tool of 
the government to guard them against suboptimal choice behaviour. However, in the current era, potentially 
vulnerable consumers have to rely on themselves to optimise their own health insurance needs. In addition, po-
tentially vulnerable consumers are unable to fully withdraw from the health insurance markets because it is not 
desirable, too difficult or too costly [3] (Clifton et al., 2012). As a result, this consumer group risks to get 
locked-in and to suffer disproportionately from their suboptimal choice behaviour. Despite these concerns sub-
stantial evidence is lacking on the extent to which potentially vulnerable consumers make use of what is seen as 
a core element of the deregulation of services: the possibility to switch health plans [8] (Jilke, 2013). 
By drawing on the insights of decision theory, we are able to expose the structural disadvantages that poten-
tially vulnerable consumers face when exercising choice behaviour (Clifton, et al., 2011). Specifically, informa-
tion overload, choice overload and the fear of making the wrong decision (regret) reinforce the tendency toward 
decision avoidance and maintaining the status quo [9]-[11] (Schwartz, 2005; Elbel and Schlesinger, 2006; Frank 
and Lamiraud, 2009). Especially potentially vulnerable consumers are expected to suffer from these psycho-
logical phenomena for three reasons. First, this group of consumers finds it harder than others to gather and 
process relevant information in order to exercise optimal choice behaviour [12] (Burden, 1998) because they 
have fewer evaluation capacities [8] (Jilke, 2013). Second, they face increased welfare risks of choosing a non- 
optimal service provider [12] (Burden, 1998). Third, the increasing complexity and information asymmetry as a 
result of international globalisation and the development to a knowledge economy exacerbates the two previ-
ously cited information- and welfare-related risks [13] (Hogg et al., 2007). The third risk is illustrated by a re-
cent study examining consumer satisfaction levels [14] (Clifton et al., 2013). The authors contend that the in-
creasing complexity in the public service sectors cause the elderly, low-skilled, and non-working service users to 
be worse off. This disadvantaged group is increasingly distanced from knowledge-sharing networks in which 
relevant information is shared about current and new social developments. 
Potentially vulnerable consumers are defined as “those who are at a disadvantage in exchange relationships 
where that disadvantage is attributable to characteristics that are largely not controllable by them at the time of 
the transaction” [15] (Andreasen and Manning, 1990, p. 13). In the last three decades, four attempts have been 
made to identify underlying dimensions and indicators of the potentially vulnerable consumer. This is shown in 
Table 1. In short, twelve dimensions of potentially vulnerable consumers are identified in the literature: age, 
education, income, health, ethnicity, labour, urbanisation, mental attitude, gender, social situation, financial situa-
tion, and Internet access. To measure these twelve dimensions, nineteen indicators are developed. In general, the 
focus has been on five dimensions of potentially vulnerable consumers, namely: age, education, income, health, 
and labour [16] (OECD, 2008). Only a very recent study in the European telephony market [6] (Jilke, 2015) uses 
the concept of potentially vulnerable consumers to examine the difference in switching behaviour compared to 
regular consumers. In his study, Jilke incorporates five underlying dimensions of EU-25 consumers in the de-
regulated telephony markets: education, age, income (proxy: house ownership), prosperity (proxy: work situation) 
and urbanisation. He contends that the inclusion of more dimensions was not possible due to data limitations. 
Considering that (1) no study has examined the switching behaviour of potentially vulnerable consumers in 
the health insurance context, and (2) we are able—on the basis of LISS panel data—to incorporate eight of the 
twelve underlying dimensions of the concept of potentially vulnerable consumers in our study, we decided to 
further elaborate on the switching behaviour of potentially vulnerable consumers in the Dutch health insurance 
market. The hypothesis tested in this study is whether potentially vulnerable consumers switch health plans less 
often than younger, higher educated, higher income, not chronically ill, working, male, urban residential con-
sumers with Internet access. 
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Table 1. An overview of the identified dimensions and indicators of the potentially vulnerable consumer concept. 
Dimensions 
& indicators 
[15] Andreasen and 
Manning (1990) [12] Burden (1998) [16] OECD (2008) 
[17] European 
Parliament (2012) 
Age X (children & the elderly) 
X 
(children & the elderly) 
X 
(children & the elderly) X 
Education X (unskilled) 
X 
(people without an 
educational qualification) 
 X 
Income X (structurally poor) 
X 
(low income) 
X 
(low income)  
Health X (physically disabled) 
X 
(disabling, long-term illness) 
X 
(disabled/incapacitated) 
X 
(mentally, physically or 
psychologically disabled ) 
Ethnicity X (minorities) 
X 
(minorities)   
Labour  X (non-working) 
X 
(non-working)  
Urbanisation   X (rural residents)  
Mental attitude    X (naivety) 
Gender    X 
Social situation    X 
Financial situation    X (debt) 
Internet access    X 
2. Methods 
2.1. Source 
The questionnaire data used in our study are derived from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sci-
ences (LISS) panel. This panel is managed and surveyed by the Institute for Data Collection and Research of 
Tilburg University (CentERdata). This institute ensures the representativeness of the panel in conjunction with 
the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Together, they invite members of the Dutch population to partici-
pate in the panel. It consists of approximately 5,000 households. Registration is based on an invitation-only pol-
icy. The participants agreed upon the analysis. 
Specifically, for this study randomised survey data from the Health Questionnaire (2008-2012) have been 
used. The average response rate is 78%. In addition, socio-demographic characteristics are drawn from the data-
set Background Variables (2007-2011). 
2.2. Sample 
A total of 16,779 respondents were included in the sample, excluding invalid and missing values list wise. As 
can be observed in Table 2, 11.1% of the respondents switched health plans. 
To construct the switching variable, we linked together information about the name of the health plan in two 
subsequent years. For example, the respondent has switched on 1 January 2009 when the name of the health 
plan has changed from 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2009. This operationalisation process is repeated to deter-
mine the number of health plan switchers on 1 January 2010, 2011, and 2012. Respondents younger than 18 
years old are omitted from the dataset, since Dutch citizens are only obliged to take out health insurance from 
the age of 18. In Figure 1, the frequency distribution of the percentage of switchers can be observed in the pe-
riod 2009-2012. The model percentage and the official percentage of switchers structurally differ, due to the fact 
that health plan switching within the same provider is not accounted for in the official percentage. Keeping this 
difference in mind, the same gradient can be observed in the figure across the model and official figures which 
adds to the reliability of our dataset. 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the consumers in the Dutch health system (n = 16,779). 
2009-2012  Frequency Valid percent  Cumulative percent 
Outcome variable      
Switching health plans  16,779    
No  14,916 88.9  88.9 
Yes  1863 11.1  100 
Predictors      
Gender  16,779    
Male  7901 47.1  47.1 
Female  8878 52.9  100 
Labour  16,779    
Working  9006 53.7  53.7 
Non-working  7773 46.3  100 
Health  16,779    
Not chronically ill  11,482 68.4  68.4 
Chronically ill  5297 31.6  100 
Age  16,779    
Younger than 60  11,212 66.8  66.8 
60 to 73  4380 26.1  92.9 
74 and older  1187 7.1  100 
Education  16,779    
Higher education  5210 31.1  31.1 
Secondary education  10,139 60.4  91.5 
Primary education  1430 8.5  100 
Urbanisation  16,779    
Urban resident  14,246 84.9  84.9 
Rural resident  2533 15.1  100 
Income  16,779    
Moderate or high income  14,340 85.5  85.5 
Low income  2439 14.5  100 
Internet access  16,779    
Yes  15,340 91.4  91.4 
No  1439 8.6  100 
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Figure 1. Health plan switching. Source: The official health plan switching figures are based 
on reports from Vektis [20]-[22] (2009, 2011, 2012). 
 
Out of the 16,779 respondents 47.1% are males compared to 52.9% females. In addition, 53.7% of the re-
spondents indicated that they worked against 46.3% that did not. Out of the respondents, 68.4% were not 
chronically ill, whereas 31.6% indicated that they suffered from a chronic disease. Concerning age, 66.8% re-
ported to be younger than 60, 26.1% mentioned to belong in the age range of 60 to 73, while 7.1% reported to be 
74 years or older. The latter two age categories are constructed to accommodate for sources that contend that 
consumers are potentially vulnerable from the age of 60 [6] (Jilke, 2015) and from the age of 74 [14] (Clifton et 
al., 2013). Out of the 16,779 respondents 31.1% successfully completed higher education, 60.4% obtained a 
secondary education degree, and 8.5% only finished primary education. Out of the 16,779 respondents 84.9% of 
the respondents resided in an urban environment, compared to 15.1% that were located in the periphery. Out of 
the 16,779 respondents 85.5% of the respondents were living equal to or above the poverty line, whereas 15.1% 
had an income below the poverty line. The poverty line is set on 60% of the gross median household income [18] 
(Eurostat, 2000) and corrected for the number of household members by taking the square root scale [19] 
(OECD, 2014). Finally, 91.4% of the respondents indicated to have access to the Internet and the remaining 8.6% 
did not have access to the Internet. Overall, the sample was representative of the Dutch population obliged to 
take out health insurance. 
2.3. Data-Analysis 
Binary logistic regression analysis was performed with SPSS 22 to detect differences between potentially vul-
nerable consumers and regular consumers in the Dutch health insurance market. It is a multivariate technique 
and particularly suited to predict the chance of health plans witching, given the predictor values which model the 
potentially vulnerable consumer concept. Maximum Likelihood is used in this technique to find the function that 
will maximize the ability to predict the probability of Y based on what we know about X. The Likelihood ratio 
test is a test of the significance of the difference between the likelihood ratio (-2LL) for the researcher’s model 
with predictors (called model chi square) minus the Likelihood ratio for the baseline model with only a constant 
in it. Significance at the 0.5 level or lower means the researcher’s model with the predictors is significantly dif-
ferent from the one with the constant only. It measures the improvement in fit that the explanatory variables 
make compared to the null model. Chi square is used to assess the significance of this ratio. 
3. Results 
Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis. It was carried out to detect if potentially vulnerable con-
sumers do indeed switch less often than regular consumers. To this end, Table 3 shows a good model fit for our 
regression model. From this model, it can be derived that over the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012: 
 non-working people switch more often; 
 chronically ill people switch less often; 
 the elderly (60 and older) switch less often; 
 people living equal to or below the poverty line switch more often; 
 people without Internet access switch less often. 
No relationships have been found between health plan switching and three potentially vulnerable consumer  
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Table 3. Regression analysis on health plan switching of potentially vulnerable consumers. 
2009-2012   
 
HEALTH PLANSWITCHING 
B(SE) Exp(B)  
 
Female (Ref: male) −0.059 (0.050) 0.943  
Non-working (Ref: working) 0.166 (0.061) 1.180***  
Chronically ill (Ref: not chronically ill) −0.273 (0.057) 0.761***  
Age (Ref: 18 to 59)    
60 to 73 −0.593 (0.072) 0.553***  
74 and older −0.613 (0.125) 0.542***  
Education (Ref: higher education)    
Secundary education −0.073 (0.055) 0.929  
Primary education −0.148 (0.106) 0.862  
Rural resident (Ref: urban resident) 0.026 (0.069) 1.027  
Low income (Ref: moderate or high income) 0.198 (0.071) 1.218***  
No Internet access (Ref: Internet access) −0.211 (0.107) 0.810*  
Constant −1.837 (0.053) 0.159***  
Correctly predicted 88.9%   
N 16,779   
Note: Model χ2(10) = 14,444, p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
characteristics, namely gender, education, and urbanisation. These results partially confirm our hypothesis: po-
tentially vulnerable consumers switch health plans less often than younger, not chronically ill consumers with 
Internet access, but the results also partially reject our hypothesis: potentially vulnerable consumers do not 
switch health plans less often than higher educated, higher income, working, male, urban residential consumers. 
4. Discussion 
On the one hand, our findings indicate that three dimensions of the potentially vulnerable consumer concept are 
prevalent in the Dutch health insurance market. More precisely, the results suggest that elderly consumers, those 
suffering from a chronic disease and those without Internet access are indeed vulnerable because they structur-
ally switch less often. As a result, we confirm that this specific group tends to get locked-in and suffers dispro-
portionately from suboptimal choice behaviour. 
Several explanations can be given to explain our findings. First, old and chronically ill health insurance con-
sumers switch less often because the health insurers are engaged in cross-selling practices [23] (Van Kleef et al., 
2014). Cross-selling refers to the practice of health insurers to automatically cancel the supplementary insurance 
or ask for a surcharge when the consumer cancels its basic health insurance policy [24] (Bes et al., 2012). Con-
sidering that half of the chronically ill and old health insurance consumers perceive that switching means that 
they cannot hold on to the favourable conditions of their current supplementary insurance, they feel locked-in 
[25] (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2011). As a consequence, they are less inclined to switch and health insurers 
experience less incentives to accommodate for the preferences of the chronically ill and old [23] (Van Kleef et 
al., 2014). Secondly, consumers without Internet access switch less often because they are more distanced from 
knowledge-sharing networks. This bears the risk of alienation from relevant information and discussions about 
new social developments. Ultimately, this can lead to an increasing fear of making the wrong switching decision 
(regret). There by actively maintaining the status quo. 
L. Booltink et al. 
 
 1067 
On the other hand, our findings also suggest that non-working health insurance consumers and those living 
equal to or below the poverty line, are less vulnerable than expected because they switch more often. As a result, 
we reject that this specific group tends to get locked-in. This group does not suffer disproportionately from 
suboptimal choice behaviour. 
These contradictory findings can be explained as follows. First, non-working consumers switch more often 
because they have more leisure time in which they can reflect on their current health insurance plan. Moreover, 
it might be that the opportunity cost of non-working people is less than those of working people. This means that 
it is more costly for working people to engage in a switching procedure than for non-working people. Secondly, 
people living equal to or below the poverty line switch more often because this group is characterised by a rela-
tively high percentage of adolescents (above the age of 18) who live independently and exhibit higher switching 
rates [22] (Vektis, 2012). Moreover, it can be argued that this low income group is motivated to switch more of-
ten because they have more to gain by taking out the most cost-effective health insurance offers. 
As does every empirical study, the current study suffers from limitations that need to be taken into account 
when considering the results. First, the indicators used in this study are collected with a maximum time lapse of 
4 months. It is not unthinkable that during this period, some of our respondents—for instance—lost their jobs 
and as a result need to be considered as non-working instead of working. At the same time, our sample of 16,779 
respondents should be robust enough to guard against undue influence on the results. 
Secondly, the necessary caution needs to be exercised when imposing our consumer switching findings on 
other deregulated service sectors such as energy or telecommunication. Each deregulated service sector is idio-
syncratic and needs to be examined in its own right. To illustrate, the study mentioned in the introduction about 
the switching behaviour of potentially vulnerable consumers in the European telephony sector found that: old 
consumers, rural residents, low-skilled consumers, and female consumers, switched less often from service pro-
vider [6] (Jilke, 2015). In contrast, our analysis only confirms that elderly consumers switch less in the Dutch 
health system. In turn, no relationships have been found for urbanisation, education, and gender. This seems to 
suggest that the defining characteristics of vulnerable consumers differ substantially across deregulated service 
contexts. 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it has been shown that the vulnerable consumer in the Dutch health insurance market is signifi-
cantly more often chronically ill, 60 and older, and without internet access. These consumers tend to switch less 
than the remaining consumers. In contrast, non-working health insurance consumers and those living equal to or 
below the poverty line switch more often. It is recommended that policymakers develop instruments to increase 
the choice of the health insurer by especially elderly consumers [26] (Duijmelinck and Van de Ven, 2015). The 
utilization of internet among elderly should be promoted as well. The same recommendation applies for the 
chronically ill. 
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